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The shift of focus post-9/11 was immediate and swift.  The Patriot Act was expeditiously 
passed by Congress and signed into law by President George W. Bush as a sign that the U.S. 
would not sit on the sidelines and wait for another attack. It was intended to reduce the law 
enforcement barriers that inhibited the investigation of suspected terrorists in the homeland.  The 
next year the Homeland Security Act of 2002 was passed and created the Department of 
Homeland Security.  This is a clear sign that a shift of focus is occurring within the federal 
government. Even the U.S. Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, and the Drug Enforcement Administration are part of the Intelligence 
Community and have responsibilities that focus on counterterrorism.  I do not contend that the 
rise of the Islamic State (ISIS) and the continued existence of other terrorist networks around the 
globe is not a serious threat.  These are very serious threats to American national security and as 
such should receive substantial focus.  I will, nevertheless, argue that the focus on non-state 
actors has allowed nation-states—like Russia—to take significant steps in regaining power 
within the international system.  State enemies, like Russia, seek to destabilize the United States 
by corrupting our core values, our government, and our economy.  Suppressing such attacks is 
imperative to U.S. security.       
The belief that Russian resentment for their loss in the Cold War is over, makes their 
aggressive actions seem more manageable and less threatening.  This resentment and reassertion 
of power—left alone—could result in a more aggressive state that continuously seeks more 
control within the international power distribution and would be willing to assert more force as it 
deems necessary. In recent years the President of the Russian Federation has increased his anti-
American rhetoric.  In a recent speech at the Valadi Club forum, he asserted that the unilateral 
dictatorship established by the United States in the post-soviet era needs to be revoked in an 
effort to reestablish a “bi-polar” world with Russia as a key player.
1
    
 It is evident that Russia is vying for more power. The question is: what does a stronger 
Russia look like?  How will their power and influence progress in the coming years?  These are 
questions that cannot be answered with certainty; though, an intelligence strategy based on a 
holistic assessment should provide a reliable set of outcomes on which to base future policy 
decisions.  This paper will provide a qualitative content analysis arguing that policymakers can 
more effectively use the Intelligence Community to achieve foreign policy goals by identifying 
how our enemies are trying to change our national interest to suit their objectives.  This paper 
will begin with a review of the practices of the IC.  Then for context I will provide a brief history 
of the Russian Federation. Finally, there will be an analysis of U.S.-Russian relations, a brief 
                                                 
1
 Vladimir Putin,  Speech to the Valdai Discussion Club,” October 24, 2014,  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zXh6HgJIPHo. 
  
review of the U.S. foreign policy strategy toward Russia, and recommendations to strengthen the 
U.S. strategy. 
What can the U.S. do to counter the Russian threat and maintain a balance of power that 
will provide renewed stability within the international system?   I propose there are three key 
steps the United States can and should take.  First, the Intelligence Community (IC), foreign 
policy analysts, and politicians should work to better understand the Russian perspective and 
especially President Vladimir Putin.  Second, the Intelligence Community should shift the focus 
of intelligence from a science back to an art and refocus resources toward state actors.  Finally, 
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What is security?  This word we use almost daily can refer to many things.  It can refer to 
a feeling of safety or to the actions implemented for the physical protection of a structure or 
person.  Most often, in the United States, the term is used in coordination with the term 
“homeland.”  Homeland Security or National Security refers to the methods used by the U.S. to 
protect the citizens, leaders, infrastructure, and ideals of the Republic in which we live.  Though 
the Department of Homeland Security was recently established, the idea of security has been 
prominent throughout the history of this country and of all nations around the world.  Classic 
political philosophers were idealistic in their writings about humanity and government; however, 
Thomas Hobbes describes human nature as nasty and argues that it leads to the “continual fear of 
violent death, and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”
1
 It is this 
uncontrollable human nature, according to Hobbes, that lends the need for civil society since fear 
of violent death is the predominant passion.
2
 It seems that this is the prevailing theory even 
living in civil society today where fear and survival dictates how a state operates.  In most 
countries around the world, security is one of the most prominent issues.  In general, most 
Americans, unlike many around the world, still feel safe in their “immediate communities.”
3
  
However, any fear they do perceive is from terrorism committed by non-state actors.  Most do 
not perceive a threat from other State actors.  They have long since abandoned this fear due to 
the prominence of the U.S. around the world and the isolation from neighboring hostile powers.  
This is a mistake.  State enemies, like Russia, seek to destabilize the United States by corrupting 
our core values, our government, and our economy.  Suppressing such attacks is imperative to 
U.S. security. 
                                                 
1
 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, edited by Edwin Curley, (Indianapolis, IN:  Hackett Publishing  
Company, Inc., 1994), 74. 
2
 Ibid., 74. 
3




How is security achieved?  There are many variations within the history of the U.S. 
security policy and the plan is variable depending on the geopolitical climate.  On the most basic 
level, the U.S. utilizes a combination of military strength, diplomatic efforts and a robust 
intelligence community. These key components are always present within every Administration 
though the degree of focus fluctuates.  The size of the military often changes depending on the 
goals of the current president.  Diplomatic ties are always of importance as they help protect 
strategic advantage around the globe in case a military conflict arises.  The U.S. would not have 
troops placed around the world without cooperative relationships.  The third prong, the 
Intelligence Community (IC), has continued to grow in size and importance.  Mention of the IC 
generally invokes images of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or the National Security 
Agency (NSA) for most individuals.  However, they comprise only a small portion of the entire 
puzzle.  There are sixteen agencies within the IC.
4
  They work both independently and in 
coordination with the other components to provide actionable intelligence products to politicians 
so they can make foreign policy decisions.  Policymakers must more effectively utilize 
intelligence to ensure that other states cannot disrupt and destabilize the U.S.   
The IC uses a variety of methods to achieve their mission.  There are four elements of 
intelligence:  collection, analysis, covert action, and counterintelligence.
5
  Collection is the 
gathering of raw data from a plethora of sources.  There are six basic intelligence sources:  
signals intelligence (SIGINT); imagery intelligence (IMINT); measurement and signature 
intelligence (MASINT); human-source intelligence (HUMINT); open-source intelligence 
                                                 
4
 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Intelligence Community:  Members of the IC,” 
http://www.dni.gov/index.php/intelligence-community/members-of-the-ic#dia,  Accessed April 6, 2016. 
5
 Abram N. Shulsky and Gary J. Schmitt, Silent Warfare:  Understanding the World of    




(OSINT), and geospatial intelligence (GEOINT).
6
  Once the data is collected it must be analyzed 
because it is usually “fragmentary, ambitious, and susceptible to widely divergent 
interpretations.”
7
  Analysis of the collected data is an attempt to provide a judgment about the 
“capabilities, intentions, and actions of another party.”
8
  The analytical reports are used to advise 
the President and other policymakers.  These have a significant impact on policy decisions.  As a 
part of intelligence, covert action is used to “influence political actions directly.”
9
  In this way it 
is different from the other elements of intelligence.  Finally, counterintelligence “seeks to protect 




The IC is a key component of the U.S. foreign policy strategy.  They provide vital 
information to policymakers and have been important to the mission of protecting the homeland 
since its inception.  Collecting information against your adversaries has been in practice in the 
United States since the Revolutionary War when General George Washington used spies to 
obtain a tactical advantage over British soldiers.
11
  The IC became main stream after WWII when 
the U.S. and the Soviet Union used espionage to gain strategic gains during the Cold War.      
 The end of the Cold War brought a sense of peace to the American public.  The 
dismantling of the Soviet Union  in 1991 began the shift in the foreign policy of the United 
States; later the terrorist attacks perpetrated  by Al-Qaeda on September 11, 2001 solidified the 
shift of focus to asymmetric non-state actors.  That is not to say that the Intelligence Community 
does not collect information in all parts of the world or that Congress and the President do not 
                                                 
6
 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Intelligence Community:  Members of the IC,” 
https://www.dni.gov/index.php/about/faq?start=2, Accessed April 6, 2016. 
7
 Shulsky and Schmitt, Silent warfare, 8. 
8
 Ibid., 8. 
9
 Ibid., 8. 
10
 Ibid., 9. 
11
 Alexander Rose, Washington’s Spies:  The Story of America’s First Spy Ring,  New York:  
Bantam Books (2006), 14. 
 
4 
consider state actors when making foreign policy decisions; however, preventing the next 
terrorist attack reigns supreme.  
The shift of focus post-9/11 was immediate and swift.  The Patriot Act was expeditiously 
passed by Congress and signed into law by President George W. Bush as a sign that the U.S. 
would not  sit on the sidelines and wait for another attack. It was intended to reduce the law 
enforcement barriers that inhibited the investigation of suspected terrorists in the homeland.  The 
next year the Homeland Security Act of 2002 was passed and created the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS).  DHS is now the largest agency in existence.
12
  This is a clear sign 
that a shift of focus is occurring within the federal government. Even the U.S. Department of 
State, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Drug 
Enforcement Administration are part of the Intelligence Community and have responsibilities 
that focus on counterterrorism.  I do not contend that the rise of the Islamic State (ISIS) and the 
continued existence of other terrorist networks around the globe is not a serious threat.  These are 
very serious threats to American national security and as such should receive substantial focus.  I 
will, nevertheless, argue that the focus on non-state actors has allowed nation-states—like 
Russia—to take significant steps in regaining power within the international system.   
I would argue that it is vital that American intelligence not lose focus on the world 
powers because they have not forgotten about the U.S.  According to Henry A. Crumpton—
former CIA Clandestine Service Officer—“[b]oth Russia and China probably have more 
clandestine intelligence operatives inside the United States now, in the second decade of the 
twenty-first century, than at the height of the Cold War.”13  It is important for the U.S. to realize 
                                                 
12
 Donald F. Kettle, System Under Stress:  Homeland Security and American Politics (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 
2007) 55-120. 
13
 Henry A. Crumpton, The Art of Intelligence:  Lessons from a Life in the CIA’s Clandestine Service (New York: 
Penguin Press, 2012), Kindle Edition, 133. 
 
5 
that the threat from Russia did not expire at the end of the Cold War.  The focus must be shared 
between the new terrorist threats and the long time threats from other established nations.  The 
current Administration’s fear of conflict and failure to follow through has crippled U.S. 
influence.  Few U.S. officials believe that Russia is a great threat to security.  While being 
interviewed during a Senate confirmation hearing to become the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, Joseph Dunford stated that Russia presents a potential threat to U.S. national security 
based on their capabilities and intent.
14
  In reaction to Russia’s involvement in Ukraine he stated:  
“If you look at their behavior, it’s nothing short of alarming.”
15
  In response, a State Department 
spokesman stated that Secretary of State John Kerry does not see Russia as an existential threat” 
despite their recent aggression.
16
  This type of opinion must be reversed.  
The belief that Russian resentment for their loss in the Cold War is over, makes their 
aggressive actions seem more manageable and less threatening.  I believe that this resentment 
and reassertion of power—left alone—could result in a more aggressive state that continuously 
seeks more control within the international power distribution and would be willing to assert 
more force as it deems necessary. 
 In recent years the President of the Russian Federation—Vladimir Putin—has increased 
his anti-American rhetoric.  In a recent speech at the Valadi Club forum, he asserted that the 
unilateral dictatorship established by the United States in the post-soviet era needs to be revoked  
                                                 
14
 Matthew Rosenberg, “Joint Chiefs Nominee Warns of Threat of Russian Agression,” New York  
Times (July 9, 2015),  http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/10/us/general-joseph-dunford-joint-chiefs-confirmation-
hearing.html?_r=0. 
15
 Lamothe, Dan, “Who’s an existential threat to the U.S.? In Washington, it depends who’s  






in an effort to reestablish a “bi-polar” world with Russia as a key player.
17
   The increasing 
propaganda and aggression outside Russian borders increase the importance of refocusing 
resources for a more comprehensive foreign policy strategy.  Obviously, the United States 
Department of State is continuously interacting with the leaders of foreign states, but the slow 
progression of Russian aggression has made their actions seem disconnected and thereby less 
threatening. This has resulted in a U.S. response that is half-hearted and cautious.    
 It is evident that Russia is vying for more power. The question is: what does a stronger 
Russia look like?  How will their power and influence progress in the coming years?  These are 
questions that cannot be answered with certainty; though, an intelligence strategy based on a 
holistic assessment should provide a reliable set of outcomes on which to base future policy 
decisions.  This paper will provide a qualitative content analysis arguing that policymakers—like 
the President—can more effectively use the Intelligence Community to achieve foreign policy 
goals by identifying how our enemies are trying to change our national interest to suit their 
objectives. This paper will begin with a review of the practices of the IC.  Then for context I will 
provide a brief history of the Russian Federation. Finally, there will be an analysis of U.S.-
Russian relations, a brief review of the U.S. foreign policy strategy toward Russia, and 






                                                 
17





Intelligence Community:  Background 
 When discussing the IC, it is important to begin with the definition of intelligence.  
Intelligence is the “[i]nformation relevant to a government’s formulation and implementation of 
policy to further its national security interests and to deal with threats from actual or potential 
adversaries.”
18
  Further, intelligence as an activity also involves the collection and analysis of 
information and the act of denying information to foes.
19
  Data is collected using several 
methods.  For example:  espionage, aerial photography, communications interceptions, and the 
examination of open source communications (i.e. radio, television, and/or social media).
20
  The 
information to be collected can range from military capabilities to social media posts of 
individual citizens.  The methods used will always be dependent on the subject of the collection.  
For instance, open source collection from newspapers and other media outlets will be more 
effective in countries where the regime does not control the dissemination of information. 
 The scope of intelligence is vast and “remains unclear” since national security is a vague 
and adaptable term.
21
  In times of war the central mission for the IC becomes clearer because 
there is a central and imminent enemy.  However, in times of peace “it is less clear which foreign 
nations, events, or circumstances threaten national security and therefore require the attention of 
the nation’s intelligence agencies.”
22
 The scope of intelligence is more complicated by the 
variations of the missions within the sixteen intelligence agencies.  The IC includes the agencies 
set forth in the following chart. 
 
                                                 
18
 Shulsky and Schmitt, Silent warfare, 1. 
19
 Ibid., 2. 
20
 Ibid., 2. 
21
 Ibid., 3. 
22
 Ibid., 3. 
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Figure 1:  Members of the IC Community
23
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 As you can see there are military intelligence agencies, civilian intelligence agencies, 
administrative agencies, and law enforcement agencies.  Though all of the entities listed have an 
overall goal of using their intelligence capabilities to secure the safety of the American public 
and infrastructure; they all have different specialties on which they focus.  The Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA), for instance, has a primary focus on drug trafficking 
networks and the diversion of prescription medications.  On the other hand, the Department of 
Energy’s Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence is focused on securing the Department of 
Energy complexes around the nation and focuses on threats to U.S. energy security.  They have 
the same goal, but very different primary objectives.  The importance of putting all of the pieces 
together cannot be overstated.         
 The Intelligence Community, as mentioned above uses six primary types of data 
collection.  These six can be sorted into three distinct categories:  human intelligence, technical 
intelligence, and open-source intelligence.  As the name implies, human intelligence collection is 
the collection of information from human sources through espionage and the recruiting of 
foreign officials who have access to useful material and are willing to pass that on to an 
                                                 
23





  This method is risky for both the intelligence operative and the source 
providing the data.  It is risky for the operative because they are working with individuals who 
have chosen to betray those around them.  This person could be reliable or they could be a 
double agent working for both sides.
25
  This is the method most individuals are familiar with as it 
has been popularized by the media and in spy movies.  This was an extremely important method 
during the Cold War.   
The second category of collection, technical intelligence (TECHINT), “refers to a group 
of techniques using advanced technology, rather than human agents, to collect information.”
26
        
It encompasses several of the methods listed above.  TECHINT includes:  signals intelligence, 
imagery intelligence, measurements and signatures intelligence, and geospatial intelligence.  
This type of collection resembles techniques used during a law enforcement investigation; 
however, it is more sophisticated and has a focus of prevention instead of prosecution.  
Finally, open-source intelligence focuses on the collection of information that is available 
for public consumption.  Common sources used for collection include newspapers, books, 
magazines, radio and television broadcasts, government statements, and social media.
27
  It is also 
common practice to as businessmen, scientists, and travelers to provide information when they 
are traveling to locations where it is difficult for an intelligence officer to operate.  They are not 
collecting secret information; instead, they are asked only to provide information that is not 
readily available in the public media.
28
  According to Abram Shulsky and Gary Schmitt, the 
“[i]mportance of open sources in the intelligence process is a matter of dispute and is ultimately 
                                                 
24
 Shulsky and Schmitt, Silent warfare, 11. 
25
 Ibid., 19. 
26
 Ibid., 22. 
27
 Ibid., 37. 
28
 Ibid., 40. 
 
10 
tied to the basic questions about the nature of intelligence”
29
 which until recently focused on the 
covert collection of data through primary sources.  I believe that open-source information can be 
a vital part of the collection of intelligence because it can provide important contextual 
information.  This is especially true in areas where operatives do not have the ability to move 
freely due to restrictive regimes.  The internet is particularly helpful where media outlets are 
controlled by the state if individual citizens have access to social media sites. Where this type of 
information is not completely restricted, local information can be retrieved when it otherwise 
would be out of reach.  
Data collection is only the initial step in the intelligence process.  The next step is 
analysis of the collected information.  Analysis “refers to the process of transforming the bits and 
pieces of information collected…into something that is usable by policy makers and military 
commanders.”
30
  The result of analysis is an “intelligence product”
31
 that can be used to 
disseminate information quickly and efficiently.  To get a finished intelligence product the data, 
despite collection method, must be reviewed, categorized, and organized to look for patterns and 
other useful information.  Shulsky and Schmitt divide intelligence products into four broad 
categories which I find helpful in understanding how processed information is transmitted to 
policy makers and military commanders.  The first category is scientific and technical 
intelligence.  This category is more precise then the other categories as it requires the blending of 
intelligence with scientific and/or technical expertise as advanced technology must be managed 
from collection to interpretation.
32
  Second, there is military intelligence.  This “deals with 
information about foreign military establishments and is needed for planning one’s own military 
                                                 
29
 Ibid., 38. 
30
 Ibid., 41. 
31
 Ibid., 41. 
32
 Ibid., 53. 
 
11 
forces in peacetime or conducting military operations in time of war.”
33
  The third category is 
economic and social intelligence.  This is described as being similar to academic social science 
research because the data used is rarely from secret sources.
34
  Finally, and most important in 
terms of this research, is political intelligence.  Political intelligence “consists of information 
concerning the political processes, ideas, and intentions of foreign countries, factions, and 
individual leaders.”
35
  It is similar to academic and journalistic writings on the topic; however, 
access to secret sources is limited groups outside the intelligence community.
36
  This is important 
in the realm of political intelligence because access to internal information is very limited 
depending on the nature of the regime or group being studied.
37
   
Intelligence products can take several forms.  Likely the most important is the President’s 
Daily Brief (PDB) which—as indicated—the President receives on a daily basis.   It contains 
information from secret sources on the “intelligence items with the highest significance.”
38
  
Circulation is limited to the President, Vice President, and a handful of senior level executive 
officials chosen by the President. 
39
   There is also a Senior Executive Intelligence Brief (SEIB) 
with fewer limitations on circulation that is provided to and tailored to the needs of the senior 
government officials responsible for national security.
40
  These two briefs represent one issue 
with the intelligence community; the issue of fulfilling the “current intelligence” functions.  This 
problem was best outlined in a Senate report which dubbed the problem the “current events 
syndrome.”  This report stated the following. 
                                                 
33
 Ibid., 54. 
34
 Ibid., 56. 
35
 Ibid., 55. 
36
 Ibid., 55. 
37
 Ibid., 55. 
38
 Ibid., 57. 
39
 Ibid., 57. 
40
 Ibid., 58. 
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“The task of producing current intelligence—analyzing day-to-day events for quick 
dissemination—today occupies much of the resources of the DI [Directorate of 
Intelligence].  Responding to the growing demands for information of current concern by 
policymakers for more coverage of more topics [sic], the DI has of necessity resorted to a 
“current events” approach to much of its research. There is less interest in and fewer 
resources devoted to in-depth analysis of problems with long range importance to 
policymakers… 
 
According to some observers, this syndrome has had an unfavorable impact on the 
quality of crisis warning and the recognition of longer term trends.  The “current events” 
approach has fostered the problem of “incremental analysis,” the tendency to focus 
myopically on the latest piece of information without systematic consideration of an 
accumulated boy of integrated evidence.  Analysts in their haste to compile the day’s 




 Another type of intelligence product is Indications and Warnings (I&W) which is the 
analysis of the probable steps and enemy would most likely take to prepare for an armed attack.
42
  
The extent of the threat is based on the number of indicators present and the totality of those 
indicators.
43
  The I&W product is more useful military matters; it is much more difficult when 
examining political matters.
44
   
 The final set of reports I will discuss include, the basic intelligence report (BIR), periodic 
reports, and the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE).  A basic intelligence report paints a picture 
of a specific situation of concern based on multiple forms or “all-source” intelligence.
45
  For 
example, a BIR on a nation’s political system could include:  “an account of all the major 
political forces and personalities, their traditional views and interest, and the ways in which they 
have related to each other.”
46
  Periodic reports are more in depth and generally focus issues 
related to regional reviews, terrorism reviews, proliferation, arms trading, and narcotics.
47
  The 
National Intelligence Estimate is the “most authoritative statement on a subject by U.S. 
                                                 
41
 Ibid., 58. 
42
 Ibid., 59. 
43
 Ibid., 59. 
44
 Ibid., 59. 
45
 Ibid., 60. 
46
 Ibid., 60. 
47





  It is intended to take a broad view of a subject and project 
the current situation into the future.   
These intelligence products are used—as previously noted—to inform the decisions of 
policymakers.  These reports are a key to the decisions that are made by the President and 
Congress.  However, like the “current events syndrome” within the intelligence community, the 
policymakers are even more concerned with current events.  They are often jumping from issue 
to issue and crisis to crisis; therefore, they are unable to obtain the area knowledge to make the 
best possible decisions.  Most do not have foreign policy knowledge and experience; before they 
were congressmen they were doctors, farmers, or another field that would not lend the 
understanding necessary for effective foreign policy decision making.  Congressman Will Hurd 
is a former intelligence officer for the CIA.  In an interview in May 2015, he stated that he was 
shocked by the caliber of the policymakers understanding of the world.
49
  The divide between 
information collection and policymaking is distressing.  Those making decision should have a 
good working knowledge of the peoples of the world.  With this in mind, this paper will move 






                                                 
48
 Ibid., 61. 
49
 William Hurd, “From CIA to Congress:  An Interview with U.S. Congressman Will Hurd,”   






Historical Development of Russia 
 The historical origins of the Russian Federation are primarily the East Slavs.
50
  The East 
Slavs were and “ethnic group that evolved into the Russian, Ukrainian, and Belarussian 
peoples.”
51
  The major pre-soviet states of the East Slavs were “medieval, Kievan Rus’, 
Muscovy, and the Russian Empire.”
52
   
 Kievan Rus’—the first East Slavic state—“emerged along the Dneipr River valley.”
53
  
Here Kievan Rus’ “controlled the trade route between the Byzantine Empire and Scandinavia.
54
  
From the Byzantine Empire, Kievan Rus’ adopted Christianity in the tenth century.
55
  Between 
980 and 1015, Prince Vladimir assisted in the conversion.  He led the “forcible conversion of 
Kievan Russian to Orthodox Christianity.”
56
  “Historians David MacKenzie and Michael Curran 
note that Vladimir’s emissaries were more impressed with the pageantry and glory of the Greek 
Orthodox ritual than with the philosophical depth of Orthodox beliefs.”
57
  Orthodoxy was chosen 
over Judaism, Islam, and Catholicism because one was the “stateless religion of a defeated 
people,” one rejected alcohol, and one “lacked splendor.”
58
  This synthesis of Byzantine and 
Slavic cultures defined “Russian culture for the next thousand years.”
59
  Armed skirmishes 
between members of the princely family caused Kievan Rus’ to degenerate and later conquest by 
the Mongols in the 13
th
 century was the decisive end.
60 
                                                 
50
 Glenn E. Curtis, ed. Russia: a country study,  Washington, D.C.: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1998, 3. 
51
 Curtis, Russia: a country study,  3. 
52
 Ibid., 3. 
53
 Ibid., 3. 
54
 Ibid., 3. 
55
 Ibid., 3. 
56
 Charles E. Ziegler, The History of Russia. 2nd ed, (Santa Barbara, California: Greenwood Press, 2009), 10. 
57
 History of Russia 2
nd
 Ziegler 10 
58
 Ziegler, The History of Russia, 10. 
59
 Curtis, Russia: a country study,  3. 
60
 Ibid., 3. 
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 After this disintegration, several states claimed to be the heirs of Kievian Rus’.
61
  One of 
these being Muscovy located at the northern edge of the “former cultural center.”
62
  Gradually, 
Muscovy acquired neighboring territories forming the basis for the Russian Empire.
63
  Muscovy 
traditions and beliefs were adopted by subsequent civilizations; most notably was the 
“subordination of the individual to the state.”
64
  The Slavic, Mongol, and Byzantine heritage of 
Muscovy provided the idea of the dominant state that later culminated in the ultimate power of 
the tsar.
65
  Another characteristic of Russian history that finds its basis in Muscovy traditions is 
continual territorial expansion.
66
    Expansion quickly went beyond ethnically Russian areas and 
by the eighteenth century the principality of Muscovy transformed into the Russian Empire.
67
  It 
stretched from Poland to the Pacific Ocean and as Russia expanded west toward Europe they 
were forced to begin modernizing their army and adopting Western technologies in order to 
compete.
68
  With the military modernization came an attempt to modernize the country as a 
whole which prompted competition between traditional Russian values and Western customs.
69 
 There was another push for modernization after Russia’s defeat in the Crimean War 
fought from 1853 to 1856.
70
  However, despite major reforms of the 1860s: 
“agriculture remained inefficient, industrialization proceeded slowly, and new social 
problems emerged.  In addition to masses of peasants seeking land to till, a new class of 
industrial workers—the proletariat—and a small but influential group of middle-class 
professionals were dissatisfied with their positions.  The non-Russian populations 
resented periodic official Russification campaigns and struggled for autonomy.  
Successive regimes of the nineteenth century responded to such pressures with 
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combination of halfhearted reform and repression, but no tsar was willing to cede 
autocratic rule or share power.  Gradually, the monarch and the state system…became 
isolated from the rest of society.”
71 
 
Even so, Russia continued to play a major role in international politics.  Defeat in the Russo-
Japanese War (1904-1905) “sparked a revolution” where “professional, workers, peasants, 
minority ethnic groups, and soldiers demanded fundamental reforms.”
72
  Nicholas II responded 
by providing a limited constitution that was quickly ignored resulting in autocracy again taking 
command in the last decade of the tsarist state.”
73
   By World War I Russia was not ready for 
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Kievan Rus’ and the Mongols 
 Prior to Kievan Rus’ there were other peoples who settled in much of the same territory.   
Present day Ukraine was occupied by Iranian and other ethnic groups; best known was the 
occupation from 600 B.C. to 20 B.C. by the Scythians.
74
  Later, the Goths and nomadic Huns, 
Avars, and Magyars briefly occupied the region during migration between A.D. 100 and A.D. 
900.
75
  These groups did not leave a notable impact on the region.  However, the Eastern Slavs 
who left a lasting impact on modern day Russia. Kievan Rus’ was the first East Slavic state and 
it created a very “complex” and unstable political system.”
76
  There is little known about the 
origin of the Slavs, but it is clear that their two lasting achievements of introducing a variant of 
the Eastern Orthodox religion and bringing together the Slavic and Byzantine cultures shaped the 
future of modern Russia.   
 During the two century rule of Kiev by the Slavs, the Grand Prince of Kiev “controlled 
the lands around the city, and his theoretically subordinate relatives ruled in other cities and paid 
him tribute.”
77
  Prince Vladimir and Prince Yaroslav brought with them greater state power and 
dominance with steady expansion. Prince Vladimir married the sister of the Byzantine Emperor 
to extend Kievan reach.
78
  It was Vladimir that brought Christianity to Kiev; this “reflected his 
personal ties with Constantinople” who dominated important trade routes.
79
  “Adherence to the 
Eastern Orthodox Church had long-range political, cultural, and religious consequences.”  Since 
the church rituals were written in Cyrillic, which was a translation originally prepared for the 
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South Slavs, the East Slavs did not have to learn Greek or even latin; therefore, they were 
isolated from Byzantine and European cultures.
80
  In his quest for expansion, Prince Yaroslav 
arranged for his sister and three daughters to marry the kings of Hungary, France, Norway, and 
Poland.
81
  It was Yaroslav who prepared and disseminated the first East Slavic law code, built 
cathedrals, and founded a school system.
82 
 The ruling clan was unable to maintain the mighty and successful Kievan state because 
the growing number of ruling members began to divide into smaller regional factions, they 
fought among themselves, and formed alliances with outside groups.
83
  After the Fourth Crusade 
took Constantinople and the associated trade routes the Kievan decline accelerated and Kievan 
Rus’ split into many principalities and regional centers.
84
  These “evolved into three 
nationalities:  Ukrainians in the southeast and southwest, Belorussians in the north and west, and 
Russians in the north and northeast.”
85
   
 The Mongol invasion came at the height of the disintegration of Kievan Rus’.   The 
impact of the Mongol invasion, beginning in 1223 and continuing until at least 1240 when they 
took the city of Kiev, is not completely clear.
86
  
 “The Mongols have been blamed for the destruction of Kievan Rus’, the breakup of the 
“Russian” nationality into three components, and the introduction of the concept of  
“oriental despotism” into Russia.  But most historians agree that Kievan Rus’ was not a 
homogenous political, cultural, or ethnic entity and that the Mongols merely accelerated a 
fragmentation that had begun before the invasion.  Some historians argue that the Mongol 
occupation resulted in the combination of European and Asian cultures in Russia.  “They 
claimed that this explained the Russian preference for a simple rural society over 
dehumanizing industrialization; for emotion over reason; for spiritual values over 
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 Historians also credit the Mongol regime with an important role in the 





Muscovy/Muscovite Russia (1240-1613) 
 Muscovy or Muscovite Russia “created a highly centralized and autocratic political 
system” and thereby “exerted a powerful influence on Russian society.”
89
  The principality of 
Vladimir-Suzdal’ contained the trading post of Moscow which was at the time insignificant and 
surrounded by natural barriers that protected it from the Mongol invasion.
90
  The development of 
Moscow trading post in the state of Muscovy can be attributed to a “series of princes who were 
ambitious, determined, and lucky.”
91
  The princes of Muscovy began gathering Russian lands to 
increase population and wealth under their jurisdiction beginning in the fourteenth century.
92
   
Ivan (III) the Great was by far the most successful at this.  In 1478 he subdued Novgorod 
and Tver’ in 1485; Muscovy gained sovereignty over the ethnically Russian lands in 1480 when 
Mongol rule ended; he obtained part of the province of Ryazan’ through inheritance; and 
convinced the princes of Rostov and Yaroslavl’ to voluntarily surrender themselves to him.
93
  
Ivan III was the first to use the title tsar and he tripled the size of Muscovy during his rule.
94
  He 
used his conquests to provide rewards for those loyal to him.  Providing land to army officers 
helped him maintain a force for his military campaigns.
95
  During the reign of Ivan the Great the 
                                                 
87
 Ziegler, The History of Russia, 19. 
88
 Curtis, Russia: a country study,  11. 
89
 Ibid., 11. 
90
 Ibid., 11. 
91
 Ibid., 11 . 
92
 Ibid., 12. 
93
 Ibid., 12. 
94
 Ibid., 12. 
95
 Ziegler, The History of Russia, 24. 
 
20 
Muscovite princes’ power grew substantially. He married the niece of the last Byzantine emperor 
and they adopted Byzantine titles and rituals.
96 
 However, “the development of the tsar’s autocratic powers reached a peak during the 
reign of Ivan IV” who was also known as Ivan the Terrible.
97
  When Ivan IV was crowned tsar 
he was recognized by the Orthodox Church as emperor; her was considered the “legitimate 
Orthodox ruler” since Constantinople had fallen to the Ottoman Empire.
98
  His reign was known 
for extreme violence, but he also “promulgated a new law code, revamped the military, and 
reorganized local government.”
99
  In response to a fire that destroyed much of Moscow, Ivan IV 
implemented many changes because he believed the fire was “punishment for his 
transgressions.”
100
  In 1550, he issued a new law code to “ensure that the same laws were applied 
equally throughout the newly acquired territories and to protect the lower gentry’s interests 
against abuses by regional governors.”
101
  He also made changes to the bureaucracy.  To do this 
he created central chanceries to improve efficiency in resource mobilization.
102
 His final changes 
were to the Orthodox Church and were mostly frivolous.  For example, he deemed several 
harmless hobbies as indecent.
103
  However, he also modified rituals, put restraints on the 
Church’s wealth, and sought to control corrupt practices.
104
  Later in 1565 he divided Muscovy 
into two parts:  his personal realm and the public territory.
105
  He confiscated land that he desired 
and destroyed his enemies; he continued to expand territory, but overreached and lost a desirable 
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position on the Baltic Sea which drained Muscovy; and led it to a civil war.
106
  This civil war 
was known as the Time of Troubles.  
 During the Time of Troubles Ivan the Terrible was succeeded by his son Fedor; however, 
due to disabilities the true power sat with Fedor’s brother-in-law Boris Godunov.
107
  During his 
reign the Russian Orthodox Church evolved into an independent entity and then he died without 
an heir in 1598; this ended the Rurik Dynasty and Godunov was proclaimed tsar.
108
  He soon 
died in 1605 allowing a man known as the First False Dmitriy to be proclaimed tsar after 
Godunov’s son was murdered.
109
  Thereafter, Poland briefly occupied Moscow, but they were 





 The Romanov family held a 300 year reign.  In the beginning they were weak rulers who 
would have been unable to restore order without lower government employees who continued to 
work independently despite weak rule.
111
  During this time the bureaucracy grew and new 
departments were formed.  They did not function optimally as they often had “overlapping and 
conflicting jurisdictions,” but they functioned just the same.
112
  The provincial governors 
implemented a comprehensive legal code in 1649 which exemplified the extent of state power as 
it officially sanctioned serfdom attaching peasants to their domicile and increasing taxes and 
regulations.
113
  There was societal discontent during this time.  Expansion continued to both the 
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East and West.  The expansion into Ukraine, who had more involvement with Western ideals, 
had unforeseen consequences.  The Russian Orthodox Church’s isolation from Constantinople 
had created an environment where differences in the church texts and practices developed.
114
  
When these differences came to light and the Russian Orthodox patriarch decided to bring the 
texts into alignment it was viewed as “improper foreign intrusion” and subsequently the church 
divided.
115
  The tsar’s court was also impacted by Western ideals emanating from Ukraine; there 
were cultural intrusions that undermined the Muscovite cultural synthesis and created a path to 
transformation.
116
   
Imperial Russia 
 “In the eighteenth century, Muscovy was transformed from a static, somewhat isolated, 
traditional state into the more dynamic, partially Westernized, and secularized Russian 
Empire.”
117
  After a series of conflicts eventually resulting in expansion into conquered 
territories of Livonia, Estonia, and Ingria, Peter the Great achieved the creation of the Russian 
Empire.  He did this through a transformation of the military and the government.  First, he 
created a naval force.
118
  Second, he reorganized the army to mimic European models.
119
  
Members of the taxpaying population were drafted for lifetime service and officers were drafted 
from the nobility class, also for lifetime service; he implemented a system of acquiring rank 
based on service rather than birth.
120
  Third, he reorganized the government structure where he 
created a senate to    organize government policy and created a system that allowed the local 
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governments to collect taxes and increase state revenue.
121
  Finally, he created educational 
institutions for males in the nobility class; however, this and his requirement that the nobility 
mimic social customs and dress of Western cultures, created greater divisions between the 
peasants and nobility.  “Peter’s reign raised questions about Russia’s backwardness, its 
relationship to the West, the appropriateness of reform from above, and other fundamental 
problems that have confronted many of Russia’s subsequent rulers.”
122
   
 Following the reign of Peter the Great, there was a series of short lived rulers. The 
position of tsar passed around many times until it was assumed by Catherine II in 1762; she 
remained in power until her death in 1796.
123
  Though she minimized them, Catherine II has 
strong ties to Europe.  She drew “political inspiration from Voltaire, Didert, and 
Montesquieu.”
124
  “She used Montesquieu’s writings…to justify exercising strong, centralized, 
and absolute authority in the extensive Russian Empire.”
125
  During her reign there was great 
expansion to the south and west; the expansion brought more power and also more animosity. 
For example, though she gained a portion of Poland when it was divided up this also eliminated 
the natural barrier that Poland had provided to Russia.
126
   Catherine II brought many changes to 
the bureaucracy within Russia.  She divided Russia into provinces and districts and gave the 
provincial governments police, administrative, and judicial systems.
127
  Catherine also 
experimented with social reforms of the Nobility by eliminating their mandatory service and of 
the townsmen, but she failed to eliminate serfdom making her reforms insufficient.
128
  She was 
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also able implement many of Peter the Great’s policies in a more effective and useful manner.  
During this time Russia “became a power capable of competing with its European neighbors on 
military, political, and diplomatic grounds” and the system she created remained unchanged until 
the end of serfdom in 1861.
129
  
 Catherine’s son Paul briefly succeeded her as tsar.  One of his primary accomplishments 
for Russia was the acquisition of Alaska.
130
  His reign abruptly ended when he was assassinated 
in 1801 by a coup after he abandoned Britain and Austria in the war against France.
131
  His son 
Alexander I succeeded him.
132
  Alexander had an eye toward foreign policy and he rejoined the 
battle against Napoleon, but having been overwhelmed by him signed the Treaty of Tilsit and 
became Napoleon’s ally in 1807.
133
  He used this alliance to expand Russia’s territory.  As any 
relationship between expansionist leaders continues the two became suspicious of one another 
which strained the alliance.  Eventually Napoleon invaded Russia with 600,000 troops, but he 
was not adequately prepared for the Russian winter and he returned home with only 30, 000 
troops. 
134
  This defeat gave Alexander great power at the Congress of Vienna when the lines of 
Europe were redrawn as he was known as the “savior of Europe.”
135
  It is important to note that 
“[h]istorians have generally agreed that a revolutionary movement was born during the reign of 
Alexander I.  Young officers who had pursued Napoleon into Western Europe came back to 
Russia with revolutionary ideas, including human rights, representative government, and mass 
democracy.”
136
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 Just after Alexander’s death, his successor and brother Nicholas I squashed an uprising in 
support of a Russian constitution.  This led Nicholas to create the Third Section, which was a 
secret police charged with restraining Russian society through censorship and other controls 
“over education, publishing, and all manifestations of public life.”
137
  Despite this, Russian 
literature and ballet flourished during this time.
138
  His reign was conservative and repressive.  
Questioning the tsar’s authority was no tolerated.
139
  Those of Russian nationality were favored 
as the preferred culture which “implied that Russian civilization was superior to that of the 
much-emulated Western nations.”
140
  The cultural growth and Russia’s power were diminished 
after Nicholas moved against the Ottoman Empire over control of the Bosporus and Dardanelles 
straights; Nicholas miscalculated his support from the British and French who joined the 
Ottomans to defeat Russia.
141
  The coming centuries were wrought with crisis for Russia.   
 
Revolution 1855-1921 
 In 1855 the reign of Alexander II began.  He instituted reforms in education, government, 
military and judiciary because there was no other option after defeat.   It was Alexander II who 
emancipated the serfs.  His plan provided the serfs with land which they were intended to pay for 
over a fifty year period and the former owners were issued bonds for their loss.
142
  The new 
peasants were unable to make the payments because the land they received was inadequate for 
farming and the former owner often lost their land because they couldn’t work the land without 
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the serf workers and the value of the bonds declined.
143
  Though this was a step forward for 
Russia it created additional unintended economic strife.  The collapse of the landlords’ control 
over the serf population also created a need for new local authorities to attend to the needs of the 
people.
144
  The local councils provided medical, educational, and infrastructure services, but law 
enforcement remained a function of the central government.
145
  According to Ziegler, this 
introduced a limited version of the concept of self-governance to the peasants.
146
  
 Alexander’s local government reforms created an elected city council system, established 
limited Western-style courts with jury systems, established a State Bank, made negligible 
attempts to lift censorship, and attempted reform of the military to a reserve system.
147
  This 
system remained in place until the Revolution of 1917.
148
  Though many changes were 
obstructed after his assassination and his son Alexander III became tsar.  During and following 
the reign of Alexander the III, radical political parties developed.  The most talented of the 
radical party leaders was Vladimir L. Lenin who quickly gained traction with his theories of a 
worker-peasant alliance.
149
  Lenin welcomed Russia’s involvement in World War I, beginning in 
1914, as he thought it would assist in his revolution and lead to a civil war that would weaken the 
regime.
150
  It was in 1917 when the November coup was a success for Lenin and his Bolshevik 
Party.
151
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It was during this period that Russia built the Trans-Siberian railroad and sold Alaska to 
the U.S.  Withdrawing from North America was a sign that Russia was overextending itself.
152
  
The railroad was an attempt for Russia to consolidate its Easter territories.  Russia’s efforts to 
consolidate interfered with Japan’s imperial expansion of the Meiji Restoration as both sought 
control of Manchuria, which was a Northern Province of China, leading to conflict between the 
two.
153
  The Russo-Japanese War “was a turning point in Russian history” because it led to “a 
popular uprising against the government.”
154
  The internal turmoil and war on multiple fronts 
weakened the regime leading to the end of tsarism by 1917 near the end of WWI and beginning 
of a new phase in Russian history.
155
  
    
1922-1991 
 The Soviet Union, made up of Russia, Ukrainian, Belorussian, and Transcaucasian 
republics, was established in December of 1922 by the Bolshevik or the Russian Communist 
Party.
156
  The Bolsheviks, led and created by Lenin, quelled the original provisional government 
which intended to establish a democracy.
157
  After Lenin’s death in 1924, Joseph V. Stalin 
became the leader of the Soviet Union.
158
  The premise of Communist beliefs were that “the 
capitalist system, driven as it is by private profit, is not only unjust but irrational and hencer 
inherently unproductive.”
159
  He quickly implemented government control over existing industry 
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and agriculture and developed a powerful industrial economy despite the starvation of many 
peasants due to poor agricultural practices on the land they were forced to communally farm.
160
   
In the post-WWII USSR, Stalin expanded the economy and sought to exert his influence 
of the spread of communism around the world eventually helping bring about the Cold War with 
the United States.
161
  Until his death in 1953, Stalin ruled with an iron fist through centralized 
power.  After his death, Nikita Khrushchev won leadership and denounced Stalin’s use of 
force.
162
  However, Khrushchev’s policies produced few gains for the Soviet Union and he was 
removed from power in 1964.
163
  A period of collective governance and shifting power followed.  
Eventually Mikhail S. Gorbachev was unanimously chosen to lead the Soviet Union.  It was his 
“policy of glasnost that freed public access to information after decades of government 
repression.”
164
  However, he did not address the fundamental weaknesses in the Soviet system 




Modern Day Russia 
The Russian Federation was established on August 24, 1991 after the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union.166 As suggested by its' name, Russia is structured as a federation.  According to the 
CIA World Factbook, a federation is a "form of government in which sovereign power is 
formally divided - usually by means of a constitution - between a central authority and a number 
of constituent regions (states, colonies, or provinces) so that each region retains some 
management of its internal affairs; [it] differs from a confederacy in that the central government 
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exerts influence directly upon both individuals as well as upon the regional units.167 Russia's 
capital is situated in Moscow which is located in European Russia and covers an area of 970 
square miles.168  Depending on the source, Russia is considered to either be part of Asia or 
combination of Europe and Asia. The U.S. State Department classifies Russia as part of, what 
they refer to as, Europe and Eurasia.169 However, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
considers Russia to be in the Central Asian region; along with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.   Either way, Russia is the world’s largest country; it 
covers 17,098, 242 square miles and is bordered by Ukraine, Poland, Norway, Mongolia, 
Lithuania, Latvia, North Korea, Kazakhstan, Georgia, Finland, Estonia, China, Belarus, and 
Azerbaijan.170 To put this into perspective, it is twice the size of Canada, which is the second 
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Table 2:  Length of Russian Border Divided by Neighboring Country
172
 
Country Distance (km) Country Distance (km) 
Azerbaijan 284 North Korea 19 
Belarus 959 Latvia 217 
China 3,645 Lithuania 227 
Estonia 290 Mongolia 3,441 
Finland 1,313 Norway 167 
Georgia 723 Poland 432 
Kazakhstan 6,846 Ukraine 1,576 
 
The Russian coastline is 37,653 kilometers; it borders the Arctic, Atlantic, and Pacific oceans. 
173
 
Below you will find a map depicting Russia and its neighboring countries.  
Figure 1:  Russia: Political Map
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 The Russian landscape varies greatly from West to East.  Eastern and Western Russia are 
divided by the Ural Mountains.  West of the Ural Mountains, European Russia is covered by a 
wide plain with low hills.
175
  To the East of the Ural Mountains is the West Siberian Plain, then 
the Central Siberian Plateau, and the Lena Plateau.
176
  “Russia’s southern border with Mongolia 
and its entire Pacific coast are marked by mountain ranges. The border with China is defined by 
the Amur River valley. Siberia contains vast coniferous forests, to the north of which is a broad 
tundra zone extending to the Arctic Ocean. The southwestern border is marked by the uplands of 
the northern slope of the Caucasus Mountains. In Russia’s southernmost extremity, flat, fertile 
steppe extends between its borders with Ukraine on the west and Kazakhstan on the east. About 
10 percent of the country is swampland; about 45 percent is forested.”
177
  
 The climate varies as much as the terrain.  It ranges from Arctic to temperate.
178
 Similarly, 
during the summer it will be cool along the Arctic coast and warm near the steeps.
179
  During the 
winter, temperatures are cool along the Black Sea, but bitterly cold in Siberia.
180
  For at least six 
months of the year, most of Russia is covered with snow and the “weather is often harsh”. 
181
     
As in other locations around the world, the climate in Russia has an effect on all aspects of life.  
“The average yearly temperature of nearly all of European Russia is below freezing, and the 
average for most of Siberia is freezing or below. Most of Russia has only two seasons, summer 
and winter, with very short intervals of moderation between them.”
182
  However, the Kaliningrad 
Oblast differs from much of the rest of the country.  Located on the Baltic Sea, Kaliningrad has a 
                                                 
175
 Library of Congress-Federal Research Division, “Country Profile: Russia,”  (October 2006): 4, 
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Russia.pdf.  
176
 Ibid., 4. 
177
 Ibid., 4. 
178
 Ibid., 4. 
179









climate similar to the American Northwest, which is a moderate maritime climate.
183
 Another 
exception to the harsh Russian climate is the Far East.  The Russian Far East has a monsoonal 
climate; the directions of the winds change from summer to winter resulting in “sharply 
differentiating temperatures.”
184
  Special requirements are necessary in regions of permafrost 
where “buildings must be constructed on pilings, machinery must be made of specially tempered 
steel, and transportation systems must be engineered to perform reliably in extremely low and 
extremely high temperatures. In addition, during extended periods of darkness and cold, there are 
increased demands for energy, health care, and textiles.”
185
 The excessively cold winters also 
determine where citizens live and how crops are grown.
186
  Everything from energy usage, 
population centers, and the food supply must work around the harsh Russian climate. 
   Despite the harsh climate, Russia enjoys a variety of natural resources.  The country has 
“thousands of rivers and inland bodies of water” providing a substantial water supply and access 
to waterway travel across the country.
187
  Most of the urban populations can be found along the 
rivers; four of the largest cities in Russia can be found on the banks of the Volga River which is 
the most important commercial waterway.
188
  However, the population centers are poorly 
distributed in relation to the water supply since most of the surface water is located east of the 
Ural Mountains and the majority of the population lives in the warmer climates. 
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Outflow Countries in 
the drainage 
basin 
Russian Regions in the drainage 
basin 
Lena River 4,400 2,734 2,418,000 Arctic Ocean Russia Irkutsk Oblast, Sakha republic 
Yenisei 
River 
5,539 3,442 2,707,000 Yenisei Gulf, Kara 
Sea, Arctic Ocean 
Russia, 
Mongolia 
 Krasnoyarsk Krai, Zabaykalsky 
Krai, Khakassia, Irkutsk Oblast, 
Buryatia, Tyva 
Ob River 3,650 2,268 2,972,497 Gulf of Ob Russia  Khanty–Mansi Autonomous 
Okrug, Tomsk Oblast, Yamalia, 
Altai Krai, Novosibirsk Oblast 
Volga River 3,530 2,193 1,380,000 Caspian Sea Russia Astrakhan Oblast, Volgograd 
Oblast, Saratov Oblast, Samara 
Oblast, Tatarstan Republic, 
Ulyanovsk Oblast, Nizhny 
Novgorod Oblast, Yaroslavl 
Oblast, Tver Oblast 
Amur River 2,824 1,755 2,824,000 Strait of Tartary Russia, China Amur Blast,Khabarovsk Krai 
Ural River 2,428 1,509 237,000 Caspian Sea Russia, 
Kazakhastan 




2,129 1,323 644,000 East Siberian Sea Russia Sakha Republic, Chukotka 
Autonomous Okrug, and Magadan 
Oblast 
Don River 1,950 1,220 425,600 Sea of Azov Russia Volgograd Oblast, Rostov Oblast, 




1,726 1,072 360,000 East Siberian Sea Russia Sakha Republic 




The above outlines the specifications on ten of the major rivers in Russia.  It should provide a  
better understanding of the waterway system. This system supported a considerable fishing 
industry, but it is now threated by pollution due to poor regulation.
191
  
 Water is not the only resource in abundance in Russia.  Russia maintains one-sixth of the 
world’s petroleum supply and one-third of the natural gas supply. 
192
 Despite the large supply, 
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much of the supply in European Russia has been depleted making it necessary for Russia to rely 
on the deposits located in Siberia.
193
  Russia also possesses “rich deposits of most valuable 
metals, diamonds, and phosphates.”
194
  Finally, Siberian Russia holds fifty percent of the 
coniferous forests found in the world; however, the forest stock is being reduced due to lack of 
forest management.
195 
People and Society 
  The people of the Russian Federation are known as Russians.  The total population of 
Russia, as of July 2013, was 142,500,482; the majority of the population is between the ages of 
25-54.
196
  73.8 percent of the total population lives in one of Russia’s major urban centers.
197
   
Table 4:  Population by City
198 
City Moscow Saint 
Petersburg 
Novosibirsk Yekaterinburg Nizhniy Novgorod 
Populaiton 
(millions) 
10.523 4.575 1.397 1.344 1.267 
 
 
  According to the 2002 census there were five primary ethnic groups in Russia:  Russian, Tatar, 
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Table 5:  Ethnic Groups as Percentage of Total Population
200 
Ethnic Group Russian Tatar Ukrainian Bashkir Chuvash Other 
Percentage of 
Total Population  
79.8 3.8 2 1.2 1.1 12.1 
 
Ethnic Russians are overwhelmingly the predominant ethnic group.  The official language is 
Russian; however, there are many other minority languages spoken throughout the country.
201
  
Russian Orthodox is the predominant religion; followed by, Muslims and Christians.
202
  
In the early 1990’s, “Russia began experiencing a negative population growth rate” due 
to an increase in infertility, a drop in life expectancy, poor nutrition and health care, and 
environmental pollution.
203
  As of 2013, males have a life expectancy of sixty-four years and 
females have an expectancy of seventy-six years.
204
  The birth rate is 12.11 births for every 1,000 
persons and the death rate is 13.97 deaths for every 1,000 persons.
205
 The birth rate is lower than 
the death rate; the population is still likely declining.     
Economy 
 According to the World Bank, Russia’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was 2.097 trillion 
dollars in 2013.
206
  During the same year, eleven percent of the total population was at the 
national poverty line.
207
  As of 2012, the unemployment rate was 5.7 percent.
208
  The Russian 
economy has changed drastically since the Soviet Union’s collapse.  They have moved to a 
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“more market-based and globally-integrated economy” from the “globally-isolated, centrally-
planned economy” it was during the Soviet era.
209
  The 1990’s brought economic reform that 
privatized many sectors; however, energy and defense remain under state control.
210
  As of 2012, 
the GDP was comprised of three sectors:  agriculture, industry and services.
211
  The service 
sector is the largest and makes ups 60.1 percent of the GDP.
212
   The industrial sector is second 
as it makes up 36 percent of the GDP and the agriculture sector comprises 3.9 percent of the 
GDP.
213
  The agriculture sector produces grain, sugar beets, vegetables, sunflower seeds, beef, 
milk, and fruit.
214
 The industrial sector includes: coal, oil, gas, chemical and metal extraction and 
production; machine building (aircraft and space vehicles); defense industries (radar, missile 
production, shipbuilding, agricultural machinery, tractors, and construction equipment, medical 
instruments, textiles, handicrafts, and electric power generating and transmitting equipment).
215 
 The country’s primary export partners are The Netherlands, China, Italy, and 
Germany.
216
  Russia exports petroleum and petroleum products, natural gas, wood and wood 
products, chemicals, metals, and a wide variety of civilian and military manufactures.
217
  Primary 
import partners include China, Germany, and Ukraine.
218
  Primary imports include:  steel, iron, 
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 As of 2013, Russia had 1,218 airports; 594 with paved runways and 624 with unpaved 
runways.
220
  There are also 49 heliports, 87,157 kilometers of railway, and 982,000 kilometers of 
roadway.
221
  There are ports and terminals at Kaliningrad, Kavkaz, Nakhodka, Novorossiysk, 
Primorsk, Saint Petersburg, and Vostochnyy.
222
  Below you will find maps of the railway and 
road systems across Russia.    
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 Russian Federation military branches include: Ground Forces, Navy, Air Forces, 
Airborne Troops, Strategic Rocket Forces, and Aerospace Defense Troops.
225
  Russian Ground 
Forces have the following combat arms:  motorized-rifle troops, tank troops, missile and artillery 
troops, and air defense of the ground troops.
226
  Males between the ages of eighteen and twenty-
seven are eligible for compulsory or voluntary military service.
227
  There is a one year obligation 
of service and reserve obligations to the age of fifty.
228
  Russia spends approximately 3.9 percent 
of its GDP on military expenditures.
229
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 As noted above, Russia is a federation; it has a central government and several 
administrative divisions.  Russia has 46 provinces, 21 republics, 4 autonomous okrugs (regions), 
9 krays, 2 federal cities, and 1 autonomous oblast.
231
  One the next page you will find a map that 
displays all of the administrative divisions of Russia.  The krays are salmon color, oblasts are 
orange, autonomous oblasts are light pink, autonomous okrugs are yellow, and republics are 
green. Oblasts are the most prominent type of administrative division and are primarily located 
in western Russian; however, much of Russian territory is part of the kray of Krasnoyarsk and 
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Figure 5:  Federal Districts of the Russian Federation 
 
The current Russian Constitution was adopted on December 12, 1993.
232
  The country 
has a civil law system with judicial review of legislative acts.
233
  The government is comprised 
of three branches:  executive, legislative, and judicial.  The Executive Branch is led by a 
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president (head of state) who appoints the prime minister (head of government), the chairman of 
the Constitutional Court, and the head of the Central Bank of Russia.
234
  The lower house of 
parliament, or the State Duma, is required to confirm these presidential nominations; however, if 
they fail to confirm the nomination for prime minister three times, the president can dissolve the 
Duma.
235
  Many presidential nomination do not require approval by the legislature.
236
  The 
president also has the power “to issue decrees that go into effect without  the parliament’s 
approval.”
237
     
 The legislative branch is made up of a bicameral Federal Assembly which has an upper 
and a lower house; the upper house is the Federation Council and the lower house called the 
State Duma.
238
  The Federation Council consists of 166 seats; the “members are appointed by the 
top executive and legislative officials in each of the 83 federal administrative units.”
239
  The 
members of the State Duma are elected by popular vote and both houses serve four-year terms.
240 
 The judicial branch consists of three high courts:  the Supreme Court of the Russian 
Federation, the Constitutional Court, and the Superior Court of Arbitration.
241
  The members of 
all three courts are appointed for life and are appointed by the president and confirmed by the 
Federation Council.
242
  Russia also has an extensive lower court system.  This includes a Higher 
Arbitration Court, provincial and regional courts, city courts in Moscow and St. Petersburg, 
autonomous provincial and district courts, and independent court systems in the republics.
243
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The judicial branch is not independent in the same way as the American Court system.  
However, according to a Library of Congress report the “judicial branch has moved very slowly 
toward and independent role in the post-Soviet era.”
244
  It took many years for the U.S. Supreme 
Court to establish its dominance in the American system; therefore, it is possible that the Russian 
courts could move toward greater independence in the future, but it much less likely due to the 
differing political climate.  It is also less likely because the Russian constitution does not call for 
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           Even during the best of times when the United States and Russia, as part of the former 
USSR, were fighting together to defeat Hitler during World War II (WWII), the relationship was 
strained and skepticism prevailed.  This distrust stemmed from distinct differences between the 
ideologies of the two states despite some similar characteristics.  As John Gaddis notes, there are 
several similarities.  Both were born out of revolution, both had advanced across vast frontiers as 
continental states, both entered the war as a result of surprise attack, and both embraced 
ideologies with global aspirations.
245
  Upon closer examination, even these similarities represent 
stark differences in the U.S. and the former USSR.  The American Revolution represented a 
break from concentration of power in a single executive.  Conversely, the Bolshevik Revolution 
was a concentration of power.  Based in the theories of Karl Marx, it “involved the embrace of 
concentrated authority as a means of overthrowing class enemies and consolidating a base from 
which a proletarian revolution would spread throughout the world.”
246
  
 At the end of WWII, the two nations had fought very different wars. The U.S., being so 
far from their own shores, fought a calculated war that allowed for minimal casualties.
247
  The 
former USSR was not so lucky.  They suffered mass casualties along with excessive property 
damage.
248
  The former Soviet Union and the United States were fighting a common enemy, but 
held very different views of how the world should look post-war.  The Soviet Union and Stalin, 
its ruler since 1924, believed that wartime expenditures should determine how territory was 
divided after the war.
249
  Since the Soviet Union had clearly expended a disproportionately 
greater amount of “blood and treasure”, Stalin believed that the USSR should and would get a 
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  However, the disproportionate losses had “robbed that country of the 
power required to secure those benefits unilaterally.”
251
  Stalin wanted “security for himself, his 
regime, his country, and his ideology, in precisely that order.”
252
As a leader he was jealous, 
cruel, ambitious, and power hungry; he eliminated his rivals.
253
  With such a powerful Soviet 
Union at his disposal he was more dangerous to the world order than one would expect.  He 
sought “domination of Europe” just as Hitler had.
254
  He also hoped that the U.S. and Great 
Britain would eventually destroy one another as Karl Marx had predicted that capitalist societies 
would do.  As Gaddis eloquently stated, this meant that for the U.S. and the U.K., WWII “was a 
victory over fascism only—not over authoritarianism and its prospects for the future.”
255
  
 Stalin had hoped that his post-war gains could be made peacefully and with the support 
of the Americans.  Until this point the U.S. had avoided becoming involved in influencing the 
state of affairs in Europe.  However, Roosevelt had alternative plans for America’s post-WWII 
influence in world affairs. He did not plan on shrinking back into isolationist tendencies of times 
past.  Instead, he sought to influence and to control the balance of power.   
There were four primary wartime goals for Roosevelt. First, he hoped to maintain allies 
in order to achieve victory as he knew that the U.S. could not defeat both Japan and Germany 
alone.
256
  Second, he hoped to “secure allied cooperation in shaping the postwar settlement” in 
order to secure lasting peace.
257
  Third, Roosevelt hoped that the allies would endorse a post-war 
settlement that “would remove the most probable causes of future wars” which included a 
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“collective security organization with the power to deter and punish aggression.”
258
  The fourth 
and final goal was to create a post-war settlement that would be approved by the American 
people which would mean there would be “no reversion to isolationism.”
259
   The differences in 
the post-war visions of the U.S. and the Soviet Union, the basic differences in the central 
ideologies of the two, and the failure to resolve the differing political objectives is at the heart of 
the beginning of the Cold War which lasted until the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.   
When Communism expanded to the East it increased fear and doubt in the United States.  
When the Chinese Communists won the battle over the Chinese Nationalists fear was initially 
contained because there was no prediction that China would become subservient to the USSR.  
The Chinese Communist Party defeated the U.S. sponsored Nationalists without help so the 
foreign policy analysts in the U.S. did not foresee the pact between China and the Soviet 
Union.
260
  This did not stop Mao, the leader of the Chinese Communist Party, from pledging his 
loyalty to Joseph Stalin and recognizing him as the international leader of the Communist 
Party.
261
  This loyalty from Mao led to the Sino-Soviet Treaty which was a pact between the two 
nations to come to the other’s aid in the event of an attack.
262
  This event caused the United 
States to change its thinking.  The realization that the Soviet Union and China were united in 
their fight for communism severely impacted the U.S. position and actions taken in the years 
following. 
During the same time period there were two high profile espionage cases that became 
public.  There was always rumor of espionage on both sides; however, this confirmed the fear 
and the extent of Soviet espionage.  It created the realization that spying made it possible for the 
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USSR to create the atomic bomb so quickly.
263
  The extent of the infiltration was a terrifying 
prospect. 
By June 1950, Joseph Stalin had provided his blessing for North Korea to invade South 
Korea with guaranteed reinforcements from China as needed.
264
  This calculated risk was taken 
because the then U.S. Secretary of State had indicated that the U.S. would not come to the aid of 
South Korea; however, Stalin’s blatant disregard for the boundaries set up by the United Nations 
(UN) at the 38
th
 parallel was such a direct “challenge to the post-war collective security” that the 
U.S. took action.
265
  This was an outcome not foreseen by Stalin before waging his proxy war.  
The Korean War provided no benefit to either the United States or the USSR.  Despite this, it is 
clear that President Truman’s actions—or restraint—in not deploying the greatest weapon the 
U.S. had in its arsenal set a tone for future wars.
266
  He is the reason that nuclear weapons have 
not been used since they were dropped on two Japanese cities as a way to bring WWII to a close.  
However, the precedent set by Truman that weapons developed do not always have to be 
deployed, was not immediately realized.  Even today there is fear that rogue nations or groups 
will not abide by this unwritten doctrine.   
 The Cold War was a time of uncertainty and fear for the American people. The threat of a 
nuclear attack always at the front of their thoughts. Both nations employed all manner of 
reconnaissance to gather secrets and gain the upper hand. The fight of ideals, the battle between 
communism and democracy, reigned for many years, but a shattered Soviet Union dissolved into 
a damaged Russia which provided a sense of security to the U.S.  However, current President 
Vladimir Putin is shifting the West’s complacency toward Russia into curiosity.  He is pushing 
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boundaries as far as he sees feasible and then backs off until the West’s discomfort with his 
actions subsides and then he tests the waters again.  He has been doing this for many years. 
 In 2008, Russia used force outside its own borders for the first time in the post-soviet era.  
They became involved in the conflict between Georgia and rebels in South Ossetian—an 
independent Georgian territory.
267
  Russia stated that their actions in Georgia sought to restore 
stability, but Russian troops entered undisputed Georgian territory making this claim less than 
genuine.
268
  Further, Russia is forward thinking and patient.  During the years preceding the 2008 
conflict, Russia was maintaining a “peacekeeping force” in South Ossetia—which operated 
primarily as an independent territory—and they issued passports to Ossetians.
269
  This allowed 
them to claim they were intervening on behalf of their own citizens.
270
  According to Marsha 
Lipman, political analyst for the Carnegie Moscow Center, “the vast majority of the Russian 
people” approved of “Russia’s behavior” and the action in Georgia.
271
  This public approval 
reflects the overall attitudes of the general Russian population who also seek a stronger place in 
the world.  It reflects the national pride and desire for more power for Russia.  The events in 
Georgia are significant because Georgia was an ally of the U.S.  Their ability to act with no 
retaliation set a precedent. 
 In 2013, despite pleas from President Obama,  Russia provided asylum to former 
National Security Agency (NSA) contractor Edward Snowden who leaked classified information 
to the press.  Snowden was a systems operator working for Booz Allen Hamilton—a technology 
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  He downloaded and released over 200,000 documents relating to U.S. 
eavesdropping activities; many of the documents were designated as “top secret” and the even 
more restrictive “special intelligence.”
273
  In several statements Snowden claimed to be a 
whistleblower helping to expose unconstitutional practices used by the intelligence 
community.
274
  The U.S. government has found no evidence that he attempted to go through the 
proper channels to raise concerns and Snowden has offered no evidence to support this theory.
275
    
Even after Snowden was indicted for stealing and exposing state secrets, he is still currently 
residing in Russia where he was granted additional asylum.
276
  Russia granted Snowden a three 
year residency extension in August 2014.
277
  Russia again skated by with little resistance. It is 
clear that President Putin has no intention to cooperate with the United States in this matter.  
Russia has chosen to harbor a fugitive to prove they have power and are not subject to U.S. 
control.    
 Later in 2014, when Russia decided to take control of the Crimean peninsula in Ukraine, 
Putin could be confident that the West would not react militarily.  The Russians understand the 
U.S. fear of being in another war.  It was again easy for Putin to claim protection of ethnic 
Russians in Crimea as many ethnic Russians reside there. Crimea was part of Russia “for 
centuries before Soviet Leader Nikita Khrushchev gave it to Ukraine as a gift in 1954.”
278
  This 
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provides a limited amount of cover for Putin as he ventures outside his own territory.  The 
economic sanctions placed on Russia by the U.S. and members of the European Union (EU) 
have had little to no success.  Putin even retaliated with an embargo on food imports from the 
U.S., EU, Canada, Australia, and Norway.
279
  Putin is protecting his image of power; he will not 
look weak in the face of Western attempts to control his actions. 
 In another act of overt intimidation  against the United States, Vladimir Putin sent two 
Russian bombers close to U.S. airspace last July 4
th
.  The Russian pilots, intercepted by U.S. 
fighter jets, are quoted as saying: “Good morning, American pilots. We are here to greet you on 
your Fourth of July Independence Day.”
280
  This is a clear taunt and an attempt to reestablish a 
presence in the international community.  I believe, it is also Putin’s way of showing that he is 
not afraid of the U.S.  This is not an insignificant event.  These types of actions are meant to test 
his boundaries.  Like a child tests a parent to determine how far they can go without punishment, 
Putin is testing the international community and in particular the United States to see what will 
be tolerated. 
 Then in late 2015, Russia joined the conflict in Syria.  Russia offered to execute air 
strikes against the terrorists.  Initially, Putin’s bombers targeted areas controlled by the Islamic 
State (ISIS); however, they quickly began campaigns in parts of Syria with little ISIS control.
281
  
It was evident that he was targeting the U.S. backed Syrian rebels fighting the Bashar al-Assad 
regime.  Outwardly, Putin states that he has no loyalty to Assad, but their meeting in October 
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2015 was front page news for the Kremlin.
282
  Early 2016 brought a Russian withdrawal from 
Syria.  News of the withdrawal was quite abrupt, but was clearly strategic in nature.  Russia has 
achieved three goals with its involvement in Syria.  First, they have shown that Russia is willing 
and able to be a player on the international stage.  Second, they have put themselves in a position 
to be an important part of any future negotiations in Syria.  Third, they aided the Assad regime 
who is a Putin ally, meaning if Assad does not lose power Putin has a hold in Syria.  Most 
importantly the strategic withdrawal is allowing Putin to do all three without overextending 
Russia’s resources.      
Russian Objectives 
In 1962, Cyril E. Black wrote that Russia’s policy decisions could have been said “to have been 
based primarily on considerations of security.”
283
   He divided the security considerations into 
four components:  stabilization of frontiers; assurance of favorable conditions for economic 
growth; unification of territories considered to be Russian by virtue of dynastic, religious, or 
national claims; and participation in alliance systems and international institutions.
284
   I believe 
these can still be—in part—used as a relevant guide to understand Russian policy objectives. 
 Black noted that the stabilization of frontiers was “less a question of geography than of 
coming to terms with the political power on the other side of the border.”
285
   The goal was to 
gain stability by eliminating the political power of a neighboring territory. This is the least 
relevant component of the foreign policy considerations; however, Russia’s annexation of 
Crimea was a way to reduce the political power of Ukraine because there was a push for stronger 
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ties with the West in the form of joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the 
European Union.  Since NATO was created to curb the spread of Soviet communism, this was 
viewed as a direct threat to Moscow because the West was inching closer to their borders.
286
   
Also, Russia has a naval base in the Crimean port city of Sevastopol.
287
  Ukraine’s alliance with 
NATO or the EU could have jeopardized this strategic base.  In this context, Russia’s actions 
could have been more easily anticipated and much less surprising to those in the West. 
  Secondly, Black notes that the theory for best achieving economic growth has varied 
among Russian leaders; however, there is agreement that economic strength is a necessity for 
national security.
288
  The current strategy reflects the importance of economic strength as well.  
In the midst of animosity with the United States and the West, President Putin has turned to the 
East seeking economic partnerships.  Russia and China signed an economic deal and financing 
agreement in May 2015.
289
  Putin is quoted as saying, “Today, China is our key strategic 
partner.”
290
  Reducing reliance on Europe for exports reduces the impact of Western sanctions. 
   The third key component of Russia’s foreign policy strategy is the “unification of 
territories considered to be Russian by virtue of dynastic, religious, or national claims.”
291
  This 
strategy is manifested in Russia’s involvement in both Ukraine and Georgia.  In both instances 
Russia argued their actions were to protect ethnic Russians.  In anticipation of this argument they 
issued passports to the citizens of both independent territories prior to becoming entangled in the 
                                                 
286 United States Department of State:  Office of the Historian, “Milestones: 1945-1952; North  
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 1949,”  https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/nato.    
287 Alia E. Dastagir, “Ukraine, Russia, Crimea:  How the story evolved,” USA Today (April 24,  
2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2014/03/20/ukraine-crisis-explainer/6610749/.  
288 Black, “The Pattern of Russian Objectives,” 14. 
289 Andrey Ostroukh,  “Russia, China Forge Closer Ties With New Economic, Financing Accords:   
Moscow turns to Asian investors to reduce reliance on Europe and the U.S. amid standoff  over Ukraine,”  Wall 
Street Journal (May 8, 2015),  http://www.wsj.com/articles/russia-china-forge-closer-ties-with-new-economic-
financing-accords-1431099095. 
290 Ibid. 
291 Black, “The Pattern of Russian Objectives,” 18. 
 
53 
conflicts.  A greater understanding of the nature of the Russian foreign policy strategy and what 
is driving its leader would have helped to better shape the U.S. response.  
 The final element of Russian foreign policy, as discussed by Black, is participation in 
alliance systems.  Historically, Russia has been involved in short-term alliances of 
opportunity.
292
  A perfect example is the alliance with the U.S. and Great Britain during WWII.  
These relationships are based solely on the need for assistance. The only example of long-term 




 Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. has been the only superpower.  Russia seeks to 
end this reign.  The United States’ place as the primary de facto world leader has been centered 
on three central missions:
294 
1. To manage and guide power relationships in a “world of shifting geopolitical 
balances” so a “more cooperative global system can emerge.” 
2. To contain civil and regional conflicts, prevent terrorism, and prevent the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 
3. To address the inequalities of the human condition and to “prompt a common 
response to new environmental and ecological threats to global well-being.” 
 
U.S. policy makers work tirelessly to influence nations around the world and to maintain 
the balance of power in a regional setting for U.S. benefit and to ensure strategic advantage 
around the globe.  This is achieved through mutual agreements and even by providing financial 
incentives.  However, unlike other states around the globe, expansionist polices are a thing of the 
past.  The new world view is in favor of maintaining the boundaries as they are drawn.  The 
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same sentiment is not ingrained in Russian culture.  Russia still aims, at a minimum, to regain 
lost territory.  Modern Russia, like imperialist Russia, sees expanding boundaries as expanding 
power.  “For four centuries, Russia has subordinated the well-being of its own population to this 
relentless, outward thrust threatening all its neighbors.  In the Russian mind, the centuries of 
sacrifice have been transmuted into a mission, partly on behalf of security, partly in the service 
of a claimed superior Russian morality.”
295
  Failure to understand and fully grasp this sentiment 
could result in failed U.S. policies.    
In lieu of taking control of new territory, the United States believes that spreading 
democracy around the globe is the best way to maintain a peaceful world.  A liberal democracy 
is a unique form of government.  The explanation can be found in part in the Democratic Peace 
Theory. Liberal democratic countries are more peaceably disposed to their neighbors.
296
  They 
behave differently for several reasons.  First, liberal democracies do not seek to alter the balance 
of power by expanding because stability is extremely important.  The best way to protect the 
things most valued in a liberal democracy—life, liberty, and property—are through peace.  
Historically, the four most common reasons states go to war are religion, honor, 
money/resources, and self-defense.
297
  Liberal democracies rarely initiate war for resources or for 
honor, and they do not go to war with regard to religion because liberalism fosters tolerance of 
others and their beliefs.  Elected leaders are constrained by the people who endure the negative 
aspects of war—loss of life, liberty, and property.
298
  Third, war in the United States no longer 
seeks to obtain new resources or territory; therefore, war costs more than the rewards that are 
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gained and as a result this motivation of war is contained within a liberal democracy.  Finally, 
self-defense can lead liberal democracies to war, but as history shows, generally only with non-
liberal democracies and other forms of government. “Non-democracies may be dangerous 
because they seek other ends.”
299
  If anything, late intervention into a necessary conflict or war is 
more common in a liberal democracy than unnecessary intervention.  
  The policy of spreading democracy to reduce the risk of war has largely failed leaving a 
Mid-East ripe for Russian influence.  As noted by Zbigniew Brzezinski, former National 
Security Advisor for President Jimmy Carter, left alone, Russia “could again become a source of 
tension and occasionally even a security threat to some of its neighbors.”
300
  As the world has 
seen they have already become a threat in Georgia and Ukraine.  No Western response to these 
actions will likely result in more of the same.  
 “Putin’s vision of that future is a backward-looking combination of assertive 
nationalism, thinly veiled hostility toward America for its victory in the Cold War, and nostalgia 
for both modernity and super power status.”
301
  It is vital to understand the Russian position for 
the U.S. to properly construct a useful foreign policy and military strategy with regard to Russia 
and the rest of the world.   In a 2001 article in the Los Angeles Times, a poll revealed that 55% 
of Russians still view the United States as a serious security threat, but only 8% of Americans 
still view Russia as a top concern for U.S. national security.
302
 Illusions that cause Americans to 
lose sight of real threats can only bring troubling surprises.    
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Les Gelb, former president of the Council on Foreign Relations, once said that “[i]f we 
treat them as enemies they become enemies, especially because Russia, China and North Korea 
are in transition.  By keeping Russia at arm’s length we do not encourage them to cooperate on 
foreign policy.” 
303
  This sentiment is reflected in the Obama Administration’s current policy as 
they work with Russia in Syria and Iran.  Though this is a logical policy on the surface it is not 
clear that this will provide any change in Russian attitudes or provide stability for Russia’s 
neighbors.  Without a deterrent, Russia will continue to threaten its’ neighbors.  The U.S. must 
be seen as not only the peacekeeper, but also as the superpower who will not back away from 
commitments with its’ allies.  Though the transplantation of democracy has not been successful 
in all instances it should be supported where it has begun to thrive.   The U.S. needs a strong and 
“stable geopolitical balance in Eurasia promoted by a renewed America.  America’s failure to 
pursue an ambitious transcontinental geopolitical vision would likely accelerate the decline of 
the West and prompt more instability in the East.”
304
       
Brzezinski argues that U.S. success as the guarantor of a renewed West might require 
embracing “a truly democratizing Russia into the West.”
305
  I agree that it would be ideal to bring 
Russia into the West, but they have been fighting this for centuries and despite changes in the 
government structure they are far from being a democracy.  In spite of the federal system of 
government, most of the power still lies in the head of state.   The current president has no 
intention of falling in line with U.S. constructs.  In a statement in March 2014, the Russian 
President stated:  “They [U.S.] have come to believe in their exclusivity and exceptionalism, that 
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they can decide the destinies of the world, that only they can ever be right.”
306
  Neither Eastern 
nor Western, Russia will not willingly come into the West while the  U.S. remains in control.   
The distorted view of Russia as a “state pursuing traditional national interests” is bound to result 
in more Russian disregard for the international norms set forth by the West.
307
  Since the breakup 
of the Soviet Union, many foreign policy analysts who viewed communism as the basis of all of 
Russia’s challenges began focusing on the internal changes happening within Russia.
308
  
Following the rule of Stalin, Mikhail Gorbachev introduced a policy of openness and 
restructuring.
309
  This shift captivated the foreign policy experts; however, the shift back toward 
and authoritarian state masquerading as a constitutional federation has largely been ignored.  
Russia’s totalitarian tendencies were present long before communism appeared as the 
predominant ideology among the Russian people.  Tsars of Russia and its preceding civilizations 
ruled most often with an iron fist; oppression of the lower classes has been a central theme in 
Russian history.  Also a central theme is a shying away from Western values.  A change in the 
structure of the political system has not changed the power dynamic within the system.  
United States foreign policy since the changes began has also largely focused on the 
internal stability of Russia as the primary component for peace. “As a general proposition, when 
foreign policy toward Russia is:  
identified with shaping Russian domestic politics, the ability to influence the external 
conduct of the Russian state is weakened. Yet, it is precisely the external actions of 
Russia that have historically presented the greatest challenge to international stability.  
Indeed, the Western democracies, by making themselves so much a party to Russia’s 
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domestic drama, provided an incentive for Russia’s leaders to escape present-day 




The increasing concern “about Russian weakness, possible state collapse, and loose nuclear 
material” rather than about any new aggression initiated by Moscow is a problem in the U.S. and 
the West more broadly.
311
 
The questions remains:  what can the U.S. do to counter the Russian threat and maintain a 
balance of power that will provide renewed stability within the international system?   I propose 
there are three key steps the United States can and should take.  First, the Intelligence 
Community (IC), foreign policy analysts, and politicians should work to better understand the 
Russian perspective and especially President Vladimir Putin’s motivations.  Second, the 
Intelligence Community should shift the focus of intelligence from a science back to an art and 
refocus resources toward state actors.  Finally, U.S. policymakers should find a way to better 
utilize the intelligence presented to them.  I will discuss each in turn. 
A new strategy is needed within the IC and political community on how to evaluate 
Russian motives and actions.  There are two important elements to keep in mind with regard to a 
new strategy.  You must consider both how Russia developed into the state it is today and 
understand Vladimir Putin as a man and leader.  The development of both can allow better 
prediction of future Russian actions.  Former CIA Director Michael Hayden said it best.  More 
important than even throwing more resources toward Russia is combatting the “analytic 
challenge of understanding Putin’s mindset.”
312
  For ease of analysis, most international relations 
theories assume that states are rational actors.  This allows for a baseline to be in place when 
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trying to predict what a state will do or how they might react to a specific situation.  However, it 
is imperative that the IC stop assuming that Putin is a rational actor and that he will react in a 
way similar to U.S. leaders put into similar positions.  There is a “failure to absorb that Putin 
does not assess his own interests in a way American’s believe he should.”
313
  They also fail to 
see that Putin does not see America as a “friend or partner.”
314
  He sees the U.S. as the 
superpower stopping Russia from regaining its’ glory.  Putin’s personal history is important to 
consider because his time in the KGB shaped him as a leader.  It trained him to be both patient 
and misleading.  This leads to a “foreign policy comparable to that during the tsarist centuries, 
grounding popular support in a sense of Russian mission seeking to dominate neighbors where 
they cannot be subjugated.”
315
 
It is just as important to view Russia’s foreign policy from inside the Russian perspective 
which is rooted in centuries of beliefs and a shared national history.  “[A]n understanding of the 
Soviet past is pivotal.”
316
  As Henry Kissinger stated, “[t]he Atlantic allies owe it to Russia to 
acknowledge that it is undertaking a historic transition [to adjust to the loss of its empire even as 
it builds historically unfamiliar institutions]...but they do themselves no favor by pretending that 
Russia has already accomplished a process of reform that is only in its infancy, or by celebrating 
Russian leaders for qualities they have yet to demonstrate.”
317
  This is a failure of U.S. foreign 
policy that emerged during the Gorbachev era.  When the Soviet Union fell, the West had hoped 
that “the momentum of freedom and democratization would help to institutionalize civil society  
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as an autonomous sphere.”
318
  However, this did not happen.  The minimal institutional 
changes achieved were reversed after Putin came into power. “The Russians profess to share 
these values [sanctity of the individual, civil rights, and rule of law in a constitutionally defined 
democratic state] but their political system does not reflect them.”
319
  Putin’s presidency has 
been defined by an increase in state influence over the lives of Russian citizens and an increase 
in military and security service control over his administration.
320
 According to Sergei 
Ljubownikow, “little has changed since the end of the Soviet Union.”
321
  I argue that a foreign 
policy based on substantial domestic changes in Russia—as mentioned above—will not produce 
positive outcomes for the U.S. when, in reality, little has changed.  The U.S. is operating on a set 
of assumptions, but they are not in line with the reality of the Russian state. 
It has been noted that “[f]or the last 13 years, the way you got ahead in America’s 
intelligence services was to specialize in stopping terrorists.”
322
  Focusing on Russia and Russian 
intelligence became old news.  The best and brightest have not had incentive to put their skills to 
use for anything other than terrorism.  Reallocating resources and talent within the IC toward 
Russia is a necessary move.  This would provide more insight into what is happening in Russia 
and provide more data points for analysts to work with.  If the intelligence community could 
provide better analysis it would assist U.S. leaders in making better decisions toward the foreign 
policy strategy.   
According to Robert D. Steele, “we [U.S. IC] are unwisely spending 75 billion dollars a 
year on global secret technical collection efforts, while spending relatively nothing on 
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processing, or interagency sharing of data, or on decision support.”
323
  Intelligence has become a 
scientific process; however, the reliance on technology to find patterns within collected data 
removes the most important part of the equation—the human element of the analyst who 
possesses a deep understanding of the region or culture in which they are evaluating.  The 
importance of a cultural and situational understanding cannot be overstated.
324
  Intelligence 
collection might be mostly a science, but analysis must be mostly an art.  This also means that 
there should be a more comprehensive methodology to the intelligence process.  It is imperative 
to realize that nothing in a system is “isolated”—it is all interconnected in some way.
325
  
Analysis should focus not only the infrastructure, the land, and the individual actors within a 
system, but on the people and the communities in which they live and exist.  Several areas of 
study are needed to obtain a comprehensive view:  geography, anthropology, psychology, 
economics, religions, demography, criminology, political affairs, and archeology.
326
  In his book, 
Kerry Patton is arguing for the formalization of a new specialty in the intelligence community—
sociocultural intelligence (SOCINT) which would include the above specialties in the analysis 
and collection processes.  He argues that SOCINT needs to be formalized so that SOCINT 
operatives can be trained.
327
  However, I would argue that it is more important to equip all 
operatives and analysts with the training needed to collect and analyze data in a more 
comprehensive method.  Better intelligence products equal better policy.        
Finally, I argue that it is important to revitalize the U.S. economy and improve itself 
domestically to regain the international authority that has diminished in recent years. The best 
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way to do that is for policymakers to gain a greater understanding of world affairs so they can 
more effectively utilize the intelligence community in all aspects of foreign policy.  According to 
Congressman Will Hurd who is a former CIA officer he was “shocked by the caliber of the 
policymakers’ understanding of other parts of the world.”
328
  Congressman Hurd has a unique 
perspective as he is the only member of congress to ever serve in the intelligence community.
329
  
All congressmen have a unique background.  There are lawyers, doctors, and farmers.  While 
these professions lend expertise in other necessary policy areas it creates a gap between the 
knowledge needed to make foreign policy decisions and their understanding of the world.  If the 
IC would work to produce unclassified comprehensive cultural studies for policymakers that 
would serve as a source of basic familiarity and awareness, I believe it would be beneficial in the 
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Russia—and other rogue nations—achieve their strategic interests by destabilizing the 
United States.  The U.S. emphasis on the threat of terrorism and the wars in both Iraq and 
Afghanistan since 2001 has provided Russia with the opportunity to regain regional strength.  
While the U.S. was distracted, Russia took the time to exert itself in the former Soviet states and 
to begin building stronger economic relationships outside of the West.  Russia also hopes to 
continue to keep the United States “distracted” in the near future.  For example, Russia’s 
involvement in Syria and Iran are attempts to prolong the “U.S. obsession with Iran.”
330
  The 
Assad regime in Syria is supported by Iran; therefore, a “pro-Iranian Syria” would be in the 
Russian interest because it would serve as a U.S. distraction from Russian affairs.
331
  The U.S. 
must avoid being sidetracked as it allows Russia to evolve into a stronger and more powerful 
state.   
Destabilization of the U.S. government has been a tactic of Russia for decades.  In 1948, 
Whittaker Chambers--one of the most important Communist Defectors--testified before the House 
Committee on Un-American Activities.  At the hearing he stated that he had assisted in organizing a small 
group of Communist Party members to infiltrate the U.S. government in Washington, D.C.
332
  
Specifically, he revealed that Alger Hiss--principal advisor to the Secretary of State--was a Soviet spy that 
had been turning over confidential State Department documents and handwritten notes to the Soviets.
333
  
The knowledge of confirmed infiltration  allowed the Soviets to not only gain valuable intelligence from 
inside the U.S. government, but it allowed them to incite fear in the American public and disrupt society 
even if this was not the original intention.  In 1950, Senator Joseph McCarthy claimed he had a list of 205 
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people who were known members of the Communist Party that worked in the State Department.
334
  
During this period in U.S. history, American citizens were unfairly accused and tried for being communist 
supporters despite a lack of evidence most of the time.
335
  McCarthyism reigned for several years and 
veered the American belief in justice off course.  Russia succeeded in disrupting the government and 
society.  They seek to do the same today. 
 Despite this my research did not reveal any U.S. government agents who were talking or 
writing about the threat from Russia; except for the new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff--General 
Joseph F. Dunford.  As previously noted, he outlined his concerns over Russian behavior during his 
confirmation hearing before the Senate.  The news media and those in academia are the only ones raising 
the issue in a public forum.  It is possible that there are government employees who are researching and 
discussing this threat internally; however, these employees would not have the authority to speak on 
behalf of the government.  Lower level government employees are not allowed to speak on behalf of the 
government or voice concerns to the public.  Administrative employees serve at the pleasure of the 
President and generally fall in line with the President’s policies.  The current Administration does not 
acknowledge that the U.S. has enemies. Instead, they seek only diplomacy with hostile nations.  
Further, Russia is being served by the current foreign policy strategy which has failed to see an 
emerging Russia as a threat. For example, President Obama’s Executive Orders “authorizing sanctions on 
individuals and entities responsible for violating the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine” have 
placed economic sanctions on Russia to disrupt financing of exports, banks, and energy companies.
336
  
These have caused damage to the Russian economy by limiting the exportation of oil to the U.S. and EU 
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nations; most of Russia’s oil exports go to the West.
337
  Though sanctions have had the intended effect of 
hampering the Russian economy, Putin has retaliated in an attempt to also destabilize the U.S. economy. 
As mentioned above, Russia initially placed an embargo on imports from several Western nations.  Then, 
he turned to China for financing cooperation.  If the two nations continue seeking closer ties they could 
alter the geopolitical climate.  This might also disrupt U.S-China relations; this would be a disturbing 
issue for the U.S. since China holds much of the U.S. debt through financing.  Russia’s lack of reliance on 
the West for improving their economy would severely limit the usefulness of sanctions as a deterrent for 
Russian aggression.  This would reduce the capacity of the U.S. and Europe to limit Putin’s power 
without a use of force.  
 Current domestic political initiatives that drain the system and increase federal 
debt also serve Russia in its race to the top.  It is important to revitalize the U.S. economy and 
improve itself domestically to regain the international authority that has diminished in recent 
years.  Increases in entitlement spending on healthcare, housing, etc. will unsurprisingly reduce 
spending on the military, intelligence community, and other security related endeavors required 
to protect the Homeland.  The emerging socialist and liberal ideologies that focus on dismantling 
the business infrastructure of the United States will bankrupt the economy leading to a state that 
will no longer have the ability to curb aggression or stabilize the international system.  Before 
the U.S. loses its place as the de facto leader of the international community policymakers must 
take control of both domestic and foreign concerns and “place greater emphasis on other 
dimensions of national power such as innovation, education, the ability to balance intelligently 
force and diplomacy, and the quality of political leadership.”
338
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Preamble to the Constitution of the Russian Federation 
 
We, the multinational people of the Russian Federation, joined by a common destiny on 
our own land, establishing human rights and freedoms, civic peace and accord, preserving 
historically developed state unity, proceeding from the universally recognized principles of equal 
rights and self-determination of peoples, revering the memory of ancestors, who have conveyed 
to us the love for the native land,  belief in goodness and justice, reviving the sovereign 
statehood of Russia and asserting the inviolability of its democratic basis, seeking to ensure the 
well-being and prosperity of Russia on the basis of responsibility for our Fatherland to present 
and future generations, considering ourselves a part of the world community, adopt the 
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